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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## DAILY BRIEF

\*Dominican Republic: Under the leadership of General Rafael Rodriguez Echevarria, top Dominican military leaders moved on 30 November to fill the vacuum left by the inability of the opposition and President Balaguer to form a coalition government. The conditions laid down by the military leaders include the establishment of a seven-man junta which would be presided over by President Balaguer and which would rule as a provisional government with legislative as well as executive powers for two years. Membership on the junta would include General Rodriguez, who would continue first in the line of succession to the presidency, and would also include "a prelate of the Catholic Church." Under the conditions proposed, the armed forces would dominate the regime. Balaguer, in a public statement, accepted the military's conditions saying that the program could be effected legally by means of a constitutional amendment.

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
Leaders of the largest opposition group, the moderate National Civic Union (UCN), regard the military move as a complete defeat. Disheartened UCN president Fiallo described it as "the dawn of a new dictatorship." The UCN issued a statement recommending an end to the general strike and suspending all UCN activities in view of the "absolute domination by military power." This statement may, however, have little effect, since UCN leaders do not exercise full control over opposition adherents. If the rioting of the past two days continues today, the chances of bloodshed are high, since military leaders have stressed that they will tolerate no further public disorders.

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Congo: The US Consulate in Elisabethville characterizes the atmosphere there as "electric." The shooting of an Indian soldier by Katangan troops, following the 27 November beating of two UN officials, reportedly has had a "serious effect" within the Indian UN contingent, whose relations with Tshombé's forces have long been acrimonious. Katangan troops, in turn, have been angered by a new UN drive to round up Tshombé's white volunteers in the Elisabethville area, and the consulate concludes that any further incidents could set off serious fighting. In an effort to reassure the UN, Katangan Interior Minister Munongo announced on 29 November that he would personally investigate the death of the Indian soldier and assure punishment of the guilty parties.

There are unconfirmed reports of fighting at Kongolo, where Tshombé's 1,400-man garrison has posed an obstacle to the movement into northern Katanga of General Lundula's central government forces. On 30 November, UN troops in Elisabethville reportedly forced the unloading of arms from a Katangan aircraft about to make a flight to Kongolo. [REDACTED]

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**\*Bulgaria:** Following Khrushchev's renewed attacks on Stalinism at the recent Soviet party congress, Bulgarian party first secretary Todor Zhivkov has taken the first step against the strong Stalinist faction of the Bulgarian party. Vulko Chervenkov, the leading figure in the Stalinist faction, was ousted from the Bulgarian politburo at a 28-29 November central committee meeting, and two supporters of Zhivkov were elevated to the politburo. The Bulgarian party has long been plagued with serious factional problems in its leadership, and Zhivkov will have to oust or demote other Stalinists still in key government and party posts in order to reduce significantly the strength of the Stalinist faction.

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India-Portugal: [ New Delhi is continuing to take advantage of Lisbon's weakening colonial position to increase pressure against Portuguese possessions in India. Renewed agitation for the "liberation" of Goa provides Nehru with an issue which he can use to maintain popular support for the Congress party as the February elections approach, and refurbish his reputation in the Asian-African community as a leader in the anti-colonial struggle. While New Delhi is making a show of force in Goan waters and may have re-positioned its military units in the area, Nehru has indicated he intends to rely on measures short of military force to "persuade" the Portuguese to give up their Indian possessions.]

[ Portugal, long apprehensive of Indian intentions toward Goa, has recently strengthened its military forces there in the belief that New Delhi is now preparing some kind of military move.] [ ]

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\*Communist China: Peiping is apparently trying to return the Communist debate over Albania to private party channels. The anniversary of the 1960 world Communist conference in Moscow which attempted to settle Sino-Soviet differences has been made the occasion for a 1 December People's Daily editorial which implicitly rejects Soviet assertions that public airing of the dispute with Albania could not be avoided. Peiping has made its support for Albania unmistakably clear over the past month, but has refrained from Tirana's vituperation against Khrushchev. The editorial cites the Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960 as the "best examples of reaching unanimity through consultations"--suggesting that the Chinese would like to have another world Communist conference to try to paper over the dispute. [REDACTED]

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## CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 15 through 28 November 1961:

1. Since our last report there have been no significant Soviet political moves affecting Moscow's position on Berlin. Soviet officials are continuing to urge early negotiations and have implied that they expect a Western initiative following current Western consultations. Since the Soviet party congress, bloc leaders have reiterated Khrushchev's line on the unimportance of an exact deadline and the need for a negotiated settlement. Both Soviet and bloc statements appear to be carefully drawn to treat West Berlin and a German treaty as separate though related items for negotiations, with priority given to a settlement for West Berlin.

2. The physical barriers at both ends of the Babelsberg checkpoint on the autobahn appear to have been erected as another visible symbol of East Germany's self-proclaimed right to control traffic traveling through the GDR. The barriers do not necessarily indicate an early East German move to exercise direct control over Allied ground access. However, the immediate effect is to constrict all traffic into a single lane immediately outside the checkpoints, thereby treating Allied vehicles on the same physical basis as non-Allied traffic. The new construction also provides an increased capability for harassing Allied traffic by deliberate slowdowns and delays.

3. There are some tenuous indications of preparations for Ulbricht's eventual replacement as party leader and, as such, the central figure in the regime, although at the present time he appears to be exercising his usual authoritative control. Domestic East German news stories appear to be emphasizing his position as chairman of the Council of State rather than as party first secretary. Moreover, there seems to have been an effort

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in recent months to bring younger party figures into top leadership positions to replace older men associated with Ulbricht since World War II.

4. The internal situation in East Germany remains substantially unchanged since our last report. Confusion, uncertainty, and hostility in the party and the populace at large, particularly following Khrushchev's renewed attacks on Stalin's "cult of personality," continue despite counter-efforts by the SED leadership.

5. Field training activity by Soviet bloc ground forces has declined since the termination of the exercises conducted in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia during the period 12 to 18 November. However, further individual exercises may be held by elements of GSFG and the East German Armed Forces.

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SELECTED INTELLIGENCE  
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

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(Available during the preceding week)

Outlook for Spain and Portugal: an assessment of their domestic and foreign politics, economic situations, and succession problems. U.S.I.B. NIE 27-61. Nov 21'61.

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Outlook for Venezuela: present political situation, external relations, outlook for survival of democratic government, and economic situation and prospects. U.S.I.B. NIE 89-61. Nov 21'61.

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### Iran Nationalists Plan New Demonstrations

[The Shah by special decree has given Prime Minister Amini the power to legislate without a parliament. Neither the Shah nor Amini wants parliamentary elections in the near future, feeling, probably correctly, that parliament would block reform legislation. The National Front has been pressing for immediate elections on the grounds that Amini's position is unconstitutional, although the front's titular leader, Mohammad Mossadeq, was granted similar powers in 1952.]

[The National Front is a loose coalition of anti-government nationalists of a wide range of opinions. It is led by Allahyar Saleh, a former Iranian ambassador to the US and chief of the Iran party, but Karim Sanjabi, chairman of the executive committee, appears to be the moving force at present. The front's moderate leadership is under constant pressure from the extremists of the National Freedom movement, who believe that the government can be reformed only by violence. The front is influential mostly among students and in the bazaar. There are no known Communists in the leadership, ]

[There is probably considerable public sympathy for the front in urban areas but little inclination to risk police retaliation by demonstrating this sympathy openly.]

[At least three nationalist demonstrations have been held in recent months with little violence. However, if the front believes that Amini, with the newly won support of the Shah, is becoming firmly established in power, it may be willing to make a maximum effort to force him out.]

### New Delhi Steps Up Pressure Against Portuguese Possessions in India

The Indian Government has campaigned for an end to Portuguese colonial rule in India since 1947. Portugal's territories comprise three widely separated enclaves along the western coast of India, the largest and most populous of which is Goa. In 1954 New Delhi engineered the takeover by local pro-Indian elements of two smaller inland enclaves, which were formally merged with the Indian Union in August 1961. In addition to periodic campaigns of propaganda and popular agitation aimed at ousting the Portuguese, New Delhi has resorted to such techniques as subversion and border crossings by bands of nonviolent "volunteers." These efforts led the Indian and Portuguese governments to break diplomatic relations in 1955. During recent years the emotionally charged "liberation" issue has been relatively quiescent.

Anti-Portuguese sentiment, particularly in the Bombay area, has been rekindled this year as Lisbon's overseas problems have mounted. The Indian Government's repeated condemnations of Portuguese "atrocities" in Angola have fanned the agitation. Shooting incidents last week involving Indian seamen and Portuguese security units in the Goa area have set off a new wave of indignation in the Indian press and Parliament. Nehru on 30 November assured Parliament "adequate steps" were being taken to meet a reported Portuguese military build-up in Goa.

During the past few weeks Nehru has injected an increasingly bellicose tone into his public statements on the subject. In general, however, he has maintained his basic line that while use of force to free the Portuguese possessions "cannot be ruled out," the Indian Government will continue to seek a peaceful solution. Nehru probably calculates that continuing psychological warfare against the Portuguese, facilitated by a steady erosion in Lisbon's colonial position around the world, in time will deliver Goa and the other enclaves into Indian control without recourse to military action.

Lisbon, on the other hand, believes that New Delhi is seeking a pretext to initiate direct military action against Goa at a

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[redacted] time when the bulk of Portugal's military force is committed to Angola. [redacted] Portugal reportedly fears that the Indians may assist exiled Portuguese oppositionists in establishing a provisional government in one of Portugal's small enclaves. This would permit Afro-Asian countries to recognize a "government-in-exile" and "legalize" direct military assistance to anti-Portuguese groups. Lisbon has reinforced its garrisons in Goa during the past several months; the US army attaché in New Delhi estimates that as of early November a total of 4,000 to 6,000 troops were stationed in Goa. [redacted]

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